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Labor and Employment Law. Rhode Island American 
Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 v. Johnston School 
Committee, 212 A.3d 156 (R.I. 2019).  Retired teachers are entitled 
to life insurance at the rate at which the policy existed upon 
retirement so long as they continue to pay premiums, and the town 
cannot raise those premiums pursuant to Rhode Island law.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Under a collective bargaining agreement between the town of 
Johnston, Rhode Island and its teachers, the town provided actively 
employed school teachers with life insurance and paid the 
insurance policy premiums.1  Upon retiring, teachers could remain 
on the life insurance policy so long as they assumed payment of the 
premiums.2  For many years, the annual cost of the life insurance 
policy was the cost “in effect at the time of the teacher’s 
retirement.”3  
In 2010, the town changed its insurance carrier to Minnesota 
Life Insurance Company (Minnesota Life) and selected a policy 
which “lowered the premium rate for active teachers and increased 
the rate for retired teachers.”4  Teachers who retired on or after 
January 1, 2011 were required to pay the new higher premium 
rate.5  In August 2013, the town of Johnston entered into another 
new policy agreement with Minnesota Life, which again 
“significantly increased the annual rate for retired teachers.”6 
As a result of the increased rates, the plaintiffs, the Rhode 
Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8307 and 
several retirees of the Johnston School Department (the 
1. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 v. Johnston Sch. Comm.,
212 A.3d 156, 157 (R.I. 2019). 
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 157–58.
6. Id. at 158.
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Association) filed for declaratory judgment in Rhode Island 
Superior Court against the defendants, the town of Johnston, the 
Johnston School Department, the Johnston School Committee, and 
various municipal officials (collectively, the Town).7  The 
Association argued per Rhode Island General Laws section 16-16-
42 (the statute),8 that the Town is statutorily “required to provide 
the life insurance policy at [the] annual cost that was in effect on 
the last day of [a teacher’s] employment.”9  The Association then 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of 
the statute prohibited the Town “from assessing increased life 
insurance rates.”10  The Town filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment, countering that while the statute was “clear and 
unambiguous,” the plain, ordinary meaning of the statute only 
required the Town to provide retirees with “the option of retaining 
the life insurance policy at ‘an amount equal to the annual cost of 
the policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s 
retirement.’”11  The Town contended that if the price of the 
insurance premium rate increased, it would be for the retiree to 
cover in full.12  The Town argued that it complied with the statute 
by “providing the retirees with the option of continuing the 
insurance coverage at the rate in effect at the retiree’s 
retirement.”13 
The Superior Court justice, after hearing arguments on both 
motions, granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment 
and declared that the Town was “required to provide life insurance 
to each retiree at the same annual cost that was in effect on the last 
7. Id.
8. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-42.
9. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 158 n.5.
10. The association argued the plain language of the statute requires the
Town to provide life insurance to retired teachers at the same annual cost it 
paid before the teacher retired.  Id. at 158.  
11. Id.
12. See id. at 157–58.
13. Id. at 158.
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day of his or her employment.”14  The Town subsequently appealed 
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court).15 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
 On appeal, the Town contended that the Superior Court erred 
in granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment and 
denying the Town’s cross-motion for summary judgment.16  The 
Town argued that the trial justice “incorrectly interpreted [the 
statute].”17  The Court reviewed the applicability of the statute de 
novo.18  The statute provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, 
any member who, at the time of retirement from service, 
has in effect life insurance provided for as a benefit of his 
or her employment shall, after retirement, be entitled to 
keep the policy of life insurance in effect by paying to the 
city or town an amount equal to the annual cost of the 
policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s 
retirement.  The policy of insurance shall remain in effect 
for so long as the member continues to make annual 
payments.19 
Although both parties agreed that the statutory language was 
“clear and unambiguous,” they each presented a different 
interpretation of the statute.20  
The Town argued that a plain and ordinary reading of the 
phrases “at the time of retirement from service” and “at the time of 
the individual’s retirement” makes clear that the Legislature 
intended to provide retirees “with the opportunity to continue their 
life insurance policy at the time period after they have 
14. The Superior Court justice found the statute to be clear and
unambiguous, and reasoned “[a]s there is no other annual cost, the only 
plausible meaning is that the Legislature intended the retiree to be substituted 
as the payor on the already established plan at the rate paid by the [t]own.”  
Id.  
15. Id.
16. Id. at 159.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-42.
20. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 159.
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permanently” separated from service.21  The Town further 
reasoned that the statute does not read “on their last day of active 
employment,” and, therefore, the plain meaning of the statute is 
that the cost of life insurance for retired teachers is “that which 
[was] ‘in effect at the beginning of the retiree’s retirement.’”22  
The Association, however, argued that the statute “requires the 
[T]own to provide retirees with the option of maintaining the
insurance policy that was in effect at their retirement at the same
annual cost that each retiree paid before retirement.”23  The
Association contended the phrase “at the time of retirement”
referred to “the day the teacher separates from employment” and
the phrase “after retirement” referred to “when the teacher has
retired.”24  Thus, according to the Association, teachers are entitled
to pay the same annual cost for their life insurance policies that
they paid while they were employed, not at a different retirement
rate.25
Per the “well established statutory analysis,”26  set forth in 
prior Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent,27 the Court 
“constru[ed] the language of the statute in accordance with its plain 
and ordinary meaning.”28  The Court concluded that the statute did 
not anticipate a “separate retiree rate.”29  Thus, the Town’s 
teachers were “entitled to retain the insurance coverage in effect at 
the time of retirement by paying the same annual cost that the 
retiree paid . . . as an active employee.”30 
21. Id.
22. Id.  In other words, in order to continue their life insurance policies,
the retirees were required to pay “the rate set for retirees, not the premium 
before the teacher retires.”  Id.  
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 159–60; See also Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d
736, 740 (R.I. 2012) (“When the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the 
words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning” (internal citation 
omitted)); Webster v. Perotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001) (“In matters of 
statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the 
act as intended by the Legislature”). 
28. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 160.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The Court found that the Legislature’s use of the phrases “at 
the time of retirement” and “after retirement” “assigned 
independent significance to each phrase.”31  The Court concluded 
the phrase “at the time of retirement” referred to “the day of or the 
day before a teacher retires from active employment.”32  The Court 
“was satisf[ied] that the proper interpretation of the statute 
provid[ed]” that any teacher who, at the time of his or her 
retirement or on his or her last day of active employment, was 
entitled to keep his or her life insurance policy in effect by paying 
the Town the same premium rate he or she had paid at the time of 
his or her retirement, or at the time of his or her last day of active 
employment.33  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the 
Superior Court justice.34 
COMMENTARY 
The Court clearly acknowledged that the Court’s primary 
objective in cases interpreting “clear and unambiguous” statutes is 
to give effect to the Legislature’s intent and ensure that each word, 
phrase, or sentence express its intended purpose.35 However, given 
the fact that both parties came to different and reasonable 
conclusions about the statute’s meaning, it seems that the statute 
was not entirely clear or unambiguous.36  Under the Town’s 
construction, the statute permitted it to pass the new insurance 
policy premium rate onto retirees every time its contract with 
Minnesota Life was renegotiated.37  The Association, on the other 
hand, construed the statute to allow retirees to pay the same 
premium rate that they had paid while they were actively 
employed.38  To the Association, if the Town renegotiated the 
Minnesota Life policy, then it was up to the Town to pay those 
costs.39   
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 159–60 (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009) and
Webster v. Perotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)). 
36. See id. at 159.
37. See id. at 157–58
38. Id. at 159.
39. See id.
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Ultimately, the Court adopted the Association’s 
interpretation.40  However, the Court’s analysis of the statute 
seems rather abrupt.  The Court simply states that, because the 
Legislature “incorporate[ed] the phrases ‘at the time of retirement’ 
and ‘after retirement,’” independent significance was assigned to 
each phrase.41  Further, the Court concluded that the two phrases 
collectively mean “the day of or the day before a teacher retires from 
active employment.”42  The Court’s analysis ends there—it provides 
no further explanation for its decision.  The Court should have gone 
into further detail regarding why the Town’s interpretation was 
unreasonable to ensure a full and robust analysis of the statutory 
language.  Perhaps, if the Legislature had intended for the 
Association’s interpretation to be the true interpretation of the 
statute, the Legislature would have been explicit in stating that the 
rate the retirees would be required to pay would be the same rate 
as the day of their retirement.  The very fact that two reasonable 
interpretations came from the same statute suggests that the 
statute was, in fact, ambiguous.43 As such, the Court should have 
gone deeper into the statutory interpretation, perhaps looking to 
the statute’s legislative history and purpose, rather than just the 
statute’s “plain meaning.”44  
The Court also seems to ignore the potential financial 
implications its interpretation of the statute could have on the 
Town.  By adopting the Association’s interpretation, the Town is 
now on the hook for covering the cost of retirees’ insurance policies. 
Given that teachers may retire around 60 years of age, the Town 
would ultimately be responsible for these ever-increasing policy 
rates for myriad retirees for the rest of their lives, so long as they 
desire life insurance coverage.  These drastic financial implications 
call into question the Court’s understanding of the legislative intent 
animating the statute.  Did the Rhode Island Legislature truly 
intend to require the Town to pay for these life insurance rates?  
40. See id. at 160.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rhode Island 
General Laws § 16-16-42 requires cities and towns to provide 
retired teachers the ability to continue their individual life 
insurance policies at the same premium rate as the teacher paid on 
the last day of his or her employment.45  The Court affirmed the 
Superior Court justice’s ruling on the matter and the case was 
remanded back to the Superior Court for further deliberation.46 
Rachel Ricci 
45. Id.
46. Id.
